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CHILD CARE AND FEDERAL TAX POLICY
Dr. Alison P. Hagy
DR. HAGY: Before I begin my comments I want to say that I
am on leave from the Census Bureau, so in my comments today I am
wearing my Duke University "hat." As such, my comments should
not be construed as the opinion of the United States Census Bureau.
The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) is the
largest federal government program in the United States aimed at
helping families with child care. It is estimated to have cost the
federal government $2.8 billion in forgone tax revenues in fiscal year
1998. There is an alternative tax relief program, the Dependent Care
Assistance Plan (DCAP), that is estimated to have cost the federal
government $890 million in forgone tax revenues in fiscal year 1998.
President Clinton, in his budget just submitted to Congress, has
proposed a generous expansion of the CDCTC along with additional
tax credits for employer-provided child care and/or employer-
provided child care resource and referral services.
WHAT IS THE MOTIVATION FOR THIS LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHILD CARE MARKET?
From an economist's perspective, the rationales for
government intervention fall into two broad categories: equity and
efficiency. In the first case, the government might be motivated by a
desire to ensure that access to a particular service or commodity is not
conditioned on income. Examples with which we are familiar are
food, housing and health care. That is, the government might desire
that some minimally acceptable standard of child care be affordable to
all families. In the second case, there may be market imperfections
that open the door for government intervention. In particular, in the
child care market there may be what are called positive externalities.
That is, there may be benefits that extend to individuals beyond the
child, or even beyond the parents, to society at large. Another
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common example of where there may be positive externalities is in
primary and secondary education. So, to the extent that there are
positive externalities in the child care market, parents may choose to
purchase a level of child care quality that is lower than what would be
considered socially optimal.
There may also be what are called informational asymmetries
in the child care market, where parents have a difficult time judging
the quality of the care they are purchasing for their child. For these
reasons as well, parents may purchase a level of child care quality that
is below what is socially desirable, in fact, even below what they
would desire for their own child, in the absence of any external
benefits to society. Finally, an often-cited goal of government
intervention in the child care market is to induce low-income parents
to work, so that they may gain work experience that may lead,
ultimately, to self-sufficiency. These are several ways the economist
would rationalize government intervention in the child care market.
How MIGHT THE GOVERNMENT INTERVENE IN THE CHILD CARE
MARKET?
There are several ways in which the government may
intervene in the child care market. Government subsidies to child care
can make child care more affordable to low-income families, thus
addressing the government's equity concerns. Government subsidies
also have the potential to induce parents to purchase higher quality
care, resolving society's desire for a higher level of quality care than
parents would choose to purchase on their own. There are subsidies
to encourage the provision of information to parents about the quality
of care available that may address informational asymmetries inherent
in the market. Finally, child care subsidies may influence labor force
participation and parent's hours-of-work decisions. Specifically, tax
relief for child care that is tied to labor force participation, such as the
CDCTC, increases the effective wage rate of the recipient, usually the
mother. Thus, tax relief is likely to influence the mother's labor force
participation decision as well as her decision regarding how many
hours to work.
The government may (and does) intervene in the child care
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market in other ways, for example, by regulating the child care
market. States and localities regulate the quality of care by regulating
certain quality-related attributes of care. For example, there are
regulations regarding the number of staff to children in the child care
arrangement, the size of the group in which the children are cared for,
and whether or not the provider has specialized training in early
education and care. Regulations, in and of themselves, can provide
information to parents simply by reducing the uncertainties inherent in
choosing a child care arrangement.
I will not talk further today about government regulation or
other interventions in the child care market intended to reduce
informational asymmetries. Instead, I will focus on government
subsidies to child care and, specifically, those subsidies that operate
through the tax code. To what extent does tax relief for child care
address the government's stated concern for equity? Do government
subsidies, in fact, induce parents to purchase higher quality care? Do
government subsidies for child care induce low-income parents to
work? These are important questions. The existence of market
imperfections, such as positive externalities or informational
asymmetries do not, in and of themselves, provide a sufficient
rationale for government intervention. Government policy, in this
case tax relief for child care, should produce more benefits for society
than what it costs the taxpayer. Let me give you a brief history of the
tax relief for child care in the United States.
The United States Income Tax Code has had special
provisions for child care expenses since 1954. Initially, work-related
child care expenses by low-income families were deductible from the
tax base. In 1971, Congress expanded deductibility to cover a broader
range of income groups. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 replaced the
deductibility of expenses with a flat 20 percent credit for work-related
child care expenses. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA) modified the credit by introducing the current declining
credit rate. ERTA also introduced Dependent Care Assistance Plans
(DCAPs) which are employer-provided benefits that effectively give
some taxpayers the choice between claiming the CDCTC and
deducting child care expenses from their taxable income. Subsequent
tax reforms have made minor changes to the tax relief provisions, but
they are substantially the same as enacted in 1981.
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I will give just a brief description of the two tax relief
programs. They are similar in certain respects. The common features
include: only the expenses for children under the age of 13 qualify;
both parents, or the single parent, must work or be enrolled in school;
child care expenses must be work-related; and, eligible expenses are
limited to the earned income of the parent with the least income. The
programs differ in the amount of eligible expenses, the value of the
reduction in taxes and in their administration. For the CDCTC,
qualified expenses are limited to $2,400 for families with one child
under age 13 and $4,800 for families with more than one child under
age 13. For families with adjusted gross incomes (AGI) below
$10,000, the credit is 30 percent of qualified expenses. The rate of the
credit falls until AGI reaches $28,000. For families with AGI above
$28,000, the credit rate is 20 percent. Importantly, the credit is
nonrefundable so that the total credit is limited to the family's tax
liability.
In contrast, DCAPs are flexible spending accounts in which
employees can reduce their pre-tax income and use the reduction to
pay for child care expenses. Total family contributions to DCAPs are
limited to $5,000. Since DCAP contributions lower taxable income,
the DCAP's value roughly equals the family's marginal tax rate
multiplied by the DCAP contribution. It should be noted that a dollar
of child care expenses cannot be subsidized through both the CDCTC
and the DCAP. Each dollar contributed to a DCAP lowers the
maximum expense qualifying for the CDCTC by a dollar. Whether a
family benefits more from a DCAP or from the CDCTC depends on
its credit rate and its marginal tax rate. Since higher income families
have lower credit rates (because of the declining credit rate) and
higher marginal tax rates, they are likely to find it advantageous to use
a DCAP, if they have access to it, rather than the CDCTC.
WHAT DOES CURRENT RESEARCH TELL US ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTIONAL
CONSEQUENCES OF TAX RELIEF FOR CHILD CARE?
In other words, does tax relief for child care satisfy the
government's desire to achieve equity? In research with Professor
Bill Gentry of Columbia University, I have studied exactly this
208 [Vol. XVI
1999] CHILD CARE & FEDERAL TAX POLICY 209
question. 5 Our primary data source is the National Child Care Survey
(NCCS), which surveys families with at least one child under age 13
and thus isolates a cohort of families with children of eligible ages for
tax relief. The NCCS also includes information that is not available
from previously analyzed tax return data. For example, it has
information on access and participation in DCAPS, so when I talk
about the distributional consequences of tax relief I am also including
the DCAP program which is, as I said before, more likely to benefit
higher income families.
Our results suggest that a broad cross-section of Americans
benefit from tax relief for child care. However, tax relief does not
reach the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution, primarily
because the CDCTC is nonrefundable. Despite this regressivity at
low income levels, we find that above the bottom quintile of the
income distribution tax relief is progressive; that is, the effective
subsidy rate steadily declines with income. We attribute this
progressivity to a combination of progressive features of the tax rules,
for example, the declining credit rate. Among families that receive
tax relief for child care expenses, the tax benefits average about 1.24
percent of family income. While our results on the progressivity of
tax relief indicate that this percentage varies systematically across
income groups, tax relief is really too small to influence the income
distribution dramatically.
I am hesitant to judge the government's tax policy toward
child care expenses in isolation from the remainder of its efforts to
help families with child care. There are numerous other programs,
including the Child Care and Development Block Grant, that are
better targeted toward helping the low-income population. However,
as the largest federal government program helping families with child
care, the CDCTC does not help those most in need.
5 See William M. Gentry & Alison P. Hagy, The Distributional Effects of the
Tax Treatment of Child Care Expenses, in EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD
TAXATION (Martin Feldstein & James M. Poterba eds., 1996).
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WHAT DOES CURRENT RESEARCH TELL US ABOUT THE ABILITY OF CHILD
CARE SUBSIDIES TO INDUCE PARENTS TO PURCHASE HIGHER QUALITY
CARE?
I have looked at this question with Professor David Blau of
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 6 Again, we use data
from the NCCS as well as data from the complementary Profile of
Child Care Settings Study. We find that parents, in fact, appear to
view quality and quantity of care as substitutes for one another. That
is, a decrease in the price per hour of care leads to an increase in the
demand for hours of care, as we might expect, but it also leads to a
decrease in the demand for quality-related attributes of care, including
staff-to-child ratio, group size and provider training. So, we find that,
basically, there is a quantity/quality trade-off here. Now, parents may,
in fact, be willing to pay for higher quality care. They may just
perceive quality differently from developmental psychologists,
specifically in ways that are much more difficult to measure than the
often-cited structural attributes of staff-to-child ratio, group size and
provider training. There has been very little work done investigating
the demand for quality in child care. Clearly, more work should be
done before definitive conclusions are drawn; however, at this
juncture there is no evidence that child care subsidies induce parents
to purchase higher quality care. In addition to the work that I have
done with David Blau on this topic, I have looked at subsidies that are
tied to the purchase of higher quality care, as measured by staff-to-
child ratio.7 For example, do these tied subsidies induce parents to
purchase higher quality care? Again, I find the answer is no.
Do CHILD CARE SUBSIDIES INDUCE LOW-INCOME PARENTS TO WORK?
The available evidence suggests that child care subsidies do
increase the mother's probability of working. A 10 percent reduction
6See David M. Blau & Alison P. Hagy, The Demandfor Quality in Child
Care, 106 J. POL. ECON. 104 (1998).
7 See Alison P. Hagy, The Demand for Child Care Quality: An Hedonic
Price Theory Approach, 33 J. HUM. RESOURCES 683 (1998).
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in the price of child care increases the probability a married mother
will work by 2 to 8 percent. There is less evidence that child care
subsidies increase hours of work, conditional on the mother already
working.8
WHAT ARE THE CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR EXPANDING TAX RELIEF FOR
CHILD CARE?
President Clinton has proposed expanding the CDCTC. In
particular, the credit rate would be increased to 50 percent for
taxpayers with AGI of $30,000 or less. For taxpayers with AGI above
$30,000, the credit rate would fall until AGI equaled $59,000. Then,
for taxpayers with AGI above $59,000, the credit rate would be 20
percent. The proposal would also extend up to $250 of additional
credit (or $500 for two or more qualifying dependents) to taxpayers'
with a qualifying dependent under the age of one. This additional
credit would be available regardless of whether the taxpayer actually
incurred any out-of-pocket child care expenses. In other words, this
latter provision would provide tax relief for stay-at-home moms.
There are additional employer tax credits for the provision of child
care services to their employees, as well as for the provision of child
care resource and referral services.
ARE THESE PROPOSALS LIKELY TO IMPROVE UPON THE CURRENT SYSTEM
OF TAX RELIEF FOR CHILD CARE?
Expanding the current CDCTC is unlikely to improve the
distributional consequences of tax relief for child care. Under the
current proposal, the CDCTC would remain nonrefundable and, as a
result, would remain inaccessible to those households at the bottom
end of the income distribution. The proposal to provide tax relief for
stay-at-home moms who have a child under the age of one could be
considered a proposal to improve the quality of care, if one believes
8 See COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD CARE
(1997).
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parental care is the best form of care for infants.
With respect to the proposed employer tax credit for the
provision of child care services to their employees, economic theory
suggests that it does not matter whether the subsidy is literally handed
to the consumer or to the provider as to who actually receives the
benefit of the subsidy. Empirical evidence suggests that the supply of
child care is quite responsive to increases in demand. For example,
the demand for paid child care has more than doubled in the past 20
years, yet the real price of child care has not changed over the same
time period. As a consequence, a subsidy that is literally handed to
providers will simply be passed on to consumers, lowering their price
of child care. Thus, we have no reason to expect that employer
subsidies will have different effects than the employee subsidies we
already have.
Finally, the proposed employer tax credit for the provision of
child care resource and referral services represents a new approach to
improving the quality of child care purchased in the market. This
approach assumes parents purchase lower quality care than would be
socially desirable due to informational asymmetries rather than due to
the existence of positive externalities. The assumption is that access
to more information through these resource and referral services
would enable parents to make better decisions about quality. This
would be true if employers can better identify quality than can
parents; if this is true then, of course, this latter approach has promise.
PROF. THOMAS: I am interested, Alison, in what you said
about cost. You said that in the past 20 years the real cost of child
care does not appear to have increased?
DR. HAGY: Right.
PROF. THOMAS: To what could we attribute that? Is that an
effect of the ceiling on tax credits for child care?
DR. HAGY: No, the supply of child care services is, as
economists would say, highly elastic, so that as the demand increases
the supply increases to satisfy the demand. As such, the price is not
driven up.
PROF. THOMAS: Some of us who have had the opportunity
to test that in the marketplace might not agree with that supply and
demand theory. There seems to be a supply problem there.
Another question I have had about some of the data in this
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area is the reliability of the pricing information, for example, that
found in the National Child Care Survey. A few years ago there was
concern that it was hard to get reliable information about what child
care workers were paid. Do you have any news about that?
DR. HAGY: Well, I would say that most of the research in the
past has relied on what parents say they pay for child care as opposed
to what providers say they are paid for child care, and there is a real
difference between the two. Economists believe that you can rely
more on what providers say they are paid. When you ask parents how
much they pay for child care, it involves the quality they choose, for
example. So, you want to define a price per hour of constant-quality
care. You define such a price with information that is provided by
suppliers because they give you a whole lot more information about
the quality of care, and about the attributes of the arrangement, than
you can collect from the parents. So, we think by using the
complementary Profile of Child Care Settings Study (where we get
information about prices from the providers) we can have a better
measure of price than we can get when we ask the parents.
THE AUDIENCE: I have two questions. In New York City,
of course, the child care market is probably a little different than it is
in a lot of other communities. There is a lot of subsidized care here,
there is a lot of off-the-books care here and there is a tremendous
amount of family care here. I am wondering how you capture that
type of informal care that is so important in areas where there are a lot
of lower income workers?
DR. HAGY: In terms of when we ask households, we get
information from them about their child care, whether it is a center-
based arrangement, a family day care arrangement or a more informal
arrangement, relatives or someone coming into their home. It is much
more difficult to collect information on the informal market from
providers, so the provider information that we have is only on center-
based providers and regulated family day care providers. You are
absolutely right; there is a real lack of information from the providers
on unregulated care. We do not know who is providing the child care;
we can not go talk to them. In fact, it has been estimated that about 90
percent of the family day care market is unregulated. It is not because
these people are providing care illegally, but just because legal
requirements do not require them to be licensed. Your question is a
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
really important one, but one to which we do not have a lot of answers
and where the data is lacking. When I am looking for price
information for the informal provider, I have to go back to what most
studies have done and use the prices that parents give us.
THE AUDIENCE: Since we have been talking so much about
price and I have paid for child care for the past 10 years, I would like
to know what the standard is per month for child care. I feel that this
$2,400 deductible has gone unchanged as long as I have been buying
child care. It seems to be a joke because paying $70.00 per month for
quality care per child seems to be very unrealistic.
DR. HAGY: Right. Well, when I said the price has not gone
up I mean the real price, not the price in nominal dollars. You are
absolutely right; they have not indexed the level of qualifying
expenses for inflation - I left that out of my talk in the interest of
time - but they are also proposing to index the level of eligible
expenses for inflation.
THE AUDIENCE: I have a question concerning the paradigm
that you are using in light of the rationale that you would only seek
state intervention to correct the market. Given your findings on
progressivity, could you actually rethink tax subsidies or state
expenditures? I think about the tax system or the tax subsidies as,
actually, a tool of redistribution, not as an intervention of the market.
Perhaps, given the findings, women in marriages are bearing child
care expenses. As such, perhaps the tax system acts as redistribution
to working women.
DR. HAGY: I suppose you could think of it as a way of
reducing the marriage penalty to a certain degree. My only question
is why is it tied to the purchase of child care? If you want to
redistribute income, just redistribute income. Don't distort people's
decisions about whether to purchase child care and what type of child
care to purchase.
THE AUDIENCE: My point is that it would be redistribution
to working women and I am not talking about working women with
children who pay for child care, but redistribution through the system
to families with children: the marriage bonus issue. But, if you would
like redistribution to a specific category of women with children, I
think that's a good thing - using child care subsidies as a
redistributive tool, not just as a tool for intervening in the market for
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child care.
DR. HAGY: There are two reasons why you might intervene
in the child care market: to try to correct any sort of market
imperfection, and to try to achieve better equity. If you are most
concerned about the lowest income groups, you are not going to
achieve equity with the tax credit because the lowest income groups
do not have a tax liability and the tax credit is nonrefundable.
PROF. THOMAS: I will end this part of the program with
another piece of tax history. The nonrefundable child care credit for
working parents has some curious features. By its terms, it offers a
maximum credit of $1,440 to working parents who spend $4,800 on
care for two or more children. 9 But the maximum credit has probably
never available to anybody. This becomes apparent if we go back and
look at the tax rates and personal exemptions and standard deductions
that have also been applicable. There is an income ceiling for the
maximum credit; to be eligible for it, the working parent or working
couple's adjusted gross income cannot exceed $10,000. Even in 1982
when it was put into effect, no qualified family configuration with
adjusted gross income below $10,000 would have owed enough
federal income tax to make full use of the statutory maximum.' 0
Indeed, today, no working parents who are within the income
limits for the maximum credit get any benefit from the child care
credit at all. This is because after giving effect to the standard
deduction and personal exemptions, no married joint filing couple or
head of household with adjusted gross income of $10,000 or less has
any regular federal income tax liability." One does not even have to
9 See I.R.C. § 21(a)(2) (1999).
10 A dual worker married couple with $10,000 of adjusted gross income who
filed a joint return and had the necessary two dependent children, in 1982 would have had
tax liability of only $312. Because the child credit is nonrefundable, its value is limited
by the amount of tax otherwise due. A sole worker parent with two children and $10,000
of adjusted gross income filing as head of household in 1982 would have had a tax
liability of $570, still $870 short of the theoretical maximum. For 1982, ERTA set the
personal exemption at $1,000 and the zero bracket amount, which had the same effect as
the standard deduction in current law, for married joint filers at $3,400 and for heads of
household at $2,300. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT
OF 1981 PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, Dec. 31, 1981,
and Public Law 97-34, for 1982 rates, deductions and zero bracket amounts.
II For 1999, a married couple that files a joint return and has two children
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reach the question of whether parents with adjusted gross income at
the $10,000 level would typically be in the position to spend the
$4,800 for child care for two children, which is the child care
expenditure level at which the theoretical maximum credit of $1,440
occurs.
DR. HAGY: Right. Those at the low end are much less likely
to purchase child care at all.
PROF. THOMAS: Yes, I agree. When we examine it and try
to apply it, the child care tax credit emerges as a provision that
promises more than it can deliver to low income working parents.
does not begin to have either taxable income or tax liability until adjusted income exceeds
$18,200, the total of the standard deduction ($7,200) and the four personal exemptions of
$2,750 each. Similarly, an unmarried working parent with two dependent children in the
home would not owe federal income tax until his or her adjusted gross income exceeded
$14,600, representing the total of the standard deduction for heads of household is $6,350
and three personal exemptions. See 1.R.C. §§ I (a) & (b), 63(c) and 151 (1999); and Rev.
Proc. 98-61, 1998-52 1RB 18, for inflation adjustments for 1999.
216 [Vol. XVI
